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ABSTRACT
BitTorrent piracy is at the core of fierce debates around net-
work neutrality. Most of the legal actions against BitTorrent
exchanges are targeted toward torrent indexing sites and
trackers. Surprisingly, little is known about the initial seeds
that insert contents on BitTorrent and about the highly ac-
tive peers that are present in a large number of torrents.
The main reason is that acquiring this knowledge requires a
large-scale continuous crawl of BitTorrent, which is believed
to be impractical. However, this information is important
for scientist and politics as many unfounded claims are made
about BitTorrent piracy.
In this paper, we present a crawl dedicated to initial seeds
identification and a large-scale continuous crawl of 103 days
during which we collect 148M IP addresses of peers partic-
ipating in 1.2M of torrents. We present the first in-depth
analysis of initial seeds’ behavior and of highly active peers.
We show that it is possible to identify initial seeds for 70%
of torrents, that initial seeds form a small community, and
that some of the most active initial seeds are in hosting cen-
ters, which make the identification of the location of the
human being running those initial seeds complex. In addi-
tion, we identified among the highly active peers very differ-
ent categories including anti-piracy groups and VPNs like
iPREDator. We also confirmed that Tor is inefficient for
BitTorrent distribution and that VPN solutions are used by
well-provisioned peers. Finally, we found an issue affecting
initial seeds in the way torrents are queued in BitTorrent
clients.
1. INTRODUCTION
“Should one’s Internet access be closed for downloading
copyrighted material?” This is the key question faced by
the European parliament in 2009 when dealing with the
three-strikes law proposal [1]. Indeed, many governments
and artists associations are fighting copyright infringements
on peer-to-peer networks with a clear focus on BitTorrent.
For instance, The Pirate Bay, the largest BitTorrent tracker
[11], has been stopped in August 2009 following a court or-
der.
Torrent indexing sites and public trackers are the targets
of most of the prosecutions because they are the visible parts
of the piracy on BitTorrent. However, surprisingly, little is
known about who inserts contents, that we call initial seeds,
and who are present in the largest number of torrents, that
we call highly active peers. We argue that this knowledge is
fundamental for scientists and for politics, as it will shed a
new light on current BitTorrent usage.
Indeed, an initial seed is the first peer who seeds a new
content in BitTorrent. Those peers are the ones who insert
contents, but nothing is known about how many they are,
their location, their behavior, their characteristics, and their
impact on torrents performance. Highly active peers are also
unknown. Finding those highly active peers is necessary in
order to understand the actors involved in the BitTorrent
ecosystem.
The main reason of this lack of knowledge is that collect-
ing the data needed to acquire this understanding is believed
to be impractical [4, 8, 11] because it requires a continuous
monitoring of peers on a large fraction of all torrents in the
Internet. Indeed, previous studies on BitTorrent monitoring
reported a high risk of being blacklisted, i.e., banned from
torrents indexing sites or tracker per IP address or prefix of
IP addresses, when too aggressive in the monitoring. The
proposed solution is usually to distribute monitoring ma-
chines, at the expense of a much higher complexity, and to
reduce the number of torrents monitored [4, 7, 9] or sacri-
fice the continuous monitoring in favor of a single snapshot
monitoring of a large set of torrents [11]. Thus, none of
those studies addressed the issue of continuously monitor-
ing a large set of torrents for a large period of time.
In this paper, we present a continuous monitoring per-
formed from May 13, 2009 to August 24, 2009 every two
hours of all peers on all torrents tracked by The Pirate Bay
trackers. We collected 148M IP addresses, spread over 21k
ASes, participating into 1.2M of torrents, and representing
3.6 exabytes of data potentially downloaded by peers. Also,
during 48 days in that period we connected to each new tor-
rent, within the first minute of their insertion on The Pirate
Bay Web site, and monitored it for 24 hours.
In addition to the collection of this large trace and to
the methodology that allowed us to collect this trace from a
single machine, our contribution on the analysis of this trace
are the following.
i) We show that it is possible to identify the IP address
of initial seeds and to map those initial seeds to users who
inserted the contents on The Pirate Bay torrent indexing
site for 70% of the users. In particular, the notion of users
in BitTorrent sites does not provide any anonymity.
ii) We show that a small community of initial seeds inserts
most of the contents we observe in our crawl. In particular,
the 1,000 most active initial seeds represent 60% of all the
torrents seeded. However, deriving the human beings coun-
try from the initial seeds IP address would be misleading.
Indeed, a large fraction of the most active initial seeds use
foreign hosting centers.
iii) We show that the queuing strategy used in BitTorrent
is suboptimal for initial seeds, and that the upload speed of
the initial seeds is critical to the performance of the torrents.
iv) We identify 6 different categories of highly active peers,
i.e, peers that are seen in a large number of torrents, that
are monitors, HTTP and SOCKS proxies, Tor nodes, VPNs
like iPREDator, and heavy peers. In addition, we show that
using those categories we can track anti-piracy groups.
v) We confirm the belief that Tor is inefficient for BitTor-
rent distribution and find that well-provisioned peers use
VPN solutions like iPREDator.
vi) We show that a continuous crawl is superior to a single
snapshot to identify highly active peers.
In section 2 we present the crawlers used in this study and
discuss the representativeness of our crawls. In section 3 we
profile initial seeds, and we profile highly active peers in
section 4. We present the related work in section 5 and
conclude in section 6.
2. LARGE-SCALE CONTINUOUS MONI-
TORING
In this section, we justify the choice of the torrent indexing
sites and trackers we decided to monitor. Then, we describe
the crawler of initial seeds and the large-scale crawler that
are used respectively to identify and monitor initial seeds,
and to perform a large-scale continuous crawl of a large frac-
tion of the torrents in the Internet. However, those two
crawlers work on overlapping data, in particular the .tor-
rent files and meta data information, and run in parallel.
In the following, we refer to the notion of infohash as a
unique identifier of a torrent. The infohash is a hash of the
info key field of the .torrent file.
2.1 The BitTorrent Ecosystem
The BitTorrent ecosystem consists of torrent indexing
sites, trackers, and peers [11]. The focus of this work is
to explore the behavior of specific peers, in particular initial
seeds and highly active peers, by monitoring torrent index-
ing sites and trackers.
Torrent indexing Web sites maintain a database of meta
data on torrents including for each torrent the torrent name,
a link to the .torrent file, the login of the user who inserted
the meta data on the torrent indexing site, comments on the
torrents, etc. Those sites can be public, i.e., they require no
authentication, or private, i.e., they require credentials to log
into the site. The public torrent indexing sites represent the
largest community, and we specifically focus on those sites.
In particular, we consider the three most popular public tor-
rent indexing sites in English that are mininova, The Pirate
Bay, and IsoHunt. However, those sites are not restricted
to torrents in English. Indeed a significant fraction of the
torrents are in other languages, in particular European and
Asian languages. Moreover, as we collected 148M unique IP
addresses in the large-scale crawl described in section 2.3, we
deem that we already cover a representative fraction of all
Internet users. Zhang et al. [11] show that the redundancy
of those sites is high, and therefore taking a few of them is
enough to cover most of the torrents.
The trackers are dedicated servers maintaining a list of
active peers for each torrent registered to those trackers.
The Pirate Bay tracker is by far the largest tracker with
more than 10M of peers and 1M of torrents. The second
largest BitTorrent tracker is one order of magnitude smaller
in number of peers and torrents tracked [11]. In this study
we specifically focus on The Pirate Bay tracker. This tracker
was stopped on August 24, 2009 due to a legal action on its
bandwidth provider. By that date, we had already moni-
tored The Pirate Bay tracker for more than 100 days, which
was enough for our study. Therefore, we decided to stop the
collection of data when the tracker was stopped, instead of
moving to another tracker.
2.2 Initial Seeds Crawler Description
The goal of this crawler is to detect and monitor initial
seeds. To achieve this goal, we implemented a crawler that
connects to each new torrent inserted on The Pirate Bay
Web site and monitors that torrent during 24 hours. We
ran this crawler continuously for 48 days, between July 8,
2009 and August 24, 2009. We describe in the following the
details of this crawler.
The Pirate Bay Web site maintains a page of newly in-
serted torrents. Our crawler retrieves this page every minute
and, most importantly, joins each of the newly added tor-
rents it has not yet joined. Then, the crawler acts as a reg-
ular BitTorrent client. In particular, it exchanges signaling
with neighbors, downloads pieces, and checks the integrity
of those pieces using the cryptographic SHA-1 hashes con-
tained in the .torrent file, which is used to fingerprint each
piece. However, the downloaded pieces are never written on
disk; once the SHA-1 is verified the piece is discarded. In ad-
dition, the crawler saves the IP address of all its neighbors,
and all HAVE and BITFIELD received messages.
When the crawler joins a torrent, it asks for 200 neighbors
to the tracker, which is the maximum number of neighbors
returned by The Pirate Bay tracker during our experiments.
As the tracker keeps state on all peers subscribed to each
torrent, it is able to detect peers connected to an abnormally
large number of torrents and blacklist their IP addresses.
We observed that the tracker blacklists the /24 prefix of IP
addresses connected to a large number of torrents. In order
to prevent this blacklisting, the crawler, once it gets a list of
neighbors for a torrent, unsubscribe from this torrent at the
tracker, but continues to monitor the peers for 24 hours.
During the 48 days of crawl, we collected 39,298 unique
infohashes uploaded by 6,210 users, excluding infohashes of
torrents for which we never succeeded to connect to a tracker
and torrents that stayed on The Pirate Bay Web site less
than 24 hours. In addition, we observed with the list of
peers returned by the tracker 9,102,817 unique IP addresses
connected to those torrents.
2.3 Large-Scale Crawler Description
The goal of this crawler is to perform a large-scale contin-
uous crawl of a large fraction of the torrents in the Internet.
On May 13, 2009, we collected all the .torrent files and meta
data available on mininova and The Pirate Bay. The col-
lected meta data is typically the content name, the type of
contents, the name of the user who inserted it, comments,
etc. We discovered 1,411,940 unique .torrent files on mini-
nova and 974,980 on The Pirate Bay. The Overlap between
both sites is only 227,620 .torrents files.
Then, from May 13, 2009 to August 24, 2009, we per-
formed the following three tasks. First, every 24 hours, we
collected all the new .torrent files and the associated meta
data added during the previous 24 hours period. Both mini-
nova and The Pirate Bay provide a dedicated interface to
retrieve the new torrents only. This phase is fast because
there are at most a few thousands of new torrents added
per day [11].
Second, we performed scrape-all requests on The Pirate
Bay tracker every 24 hours. Upon receiving this request, the
tracker returns the infohashes of all its torrents. We found
that all URLs pointing to The Pirate Bay tracker resolved to
8 IP addresses. Those 8 IP addresses correspond to a cluster
of machines that are most of the time synchronized, but not
always. In order to do not miss torrents, we performed our
scrape-all requests on all 8 IP addresses and then extracted
the unique infohashes. Those requests generate 1GB of data
and take 15 minutes. In addition to infohashes, scrape-all
requests return the number of seeds and leechers in each
torrent.
We tried to map the corresponding .torrent files and meta
information to all infohashes collected during this phase.
When we did not find the corresponding .torrent file from
the data retrieved on The Pirate Bay and mininova, we made
a request on IsoHunt. We found 365,441 additional .torrent
files on IsoHunt.
Third, every two hours, we crawled The Pirate Bay tracker
in order to retrieve the list of couples (IP,port) for all peers
that were in torrents discovered in the scrape-all requests
with at least one seed and one leecher. This task works as
follows. For each infohash, the crawler computes how many
independent requests R must be performed in order to re-
trieve at least 90% of the peers in the torrent when each
request results in 200 peers retrieved at random from the
tracker, which is the maximum number of peers returned by
The Pirate Bay tracker. Then, the crawler starts a round
of R parallel instances of a dummy BitTorrent client, each
client started on a different port number, whose only one
goal is to get a list of peers from the tracker. Once a round is
completed, the task removes all duplicate couples (IP,port),
makes sure that indeed 90% of the peers of the torrent were
retrieved, and saves the list of couples (IP,port). In the case
where fewer than 90% of the peers were discovered during
the first round, additional rounds are performed until 90% of
the peers are retrieved. The list of (IP,port) for the largest
torrent takes less than 1 second to retrieve, and this third
task is completed on all torrents (between 500k and 800k
torrents depending on the crawls) in half an hour. Thus,
each tracker crawl can be considered as an instantaneous
snapshot of the torrents. In the following, we call each of
such crawls a snapshot. As for the initial seed crawler, this
crawler unsubscribes from each torrent at the tracker in or-
der to prevent being blacklisted.
We ran this crawler from a single computer with a dual
core processor, 32 GByte of RAM and 10 TByte NAS. Our
crawler is extremely lightweight and scalable for the follow-
ing reasons. First, we do not use a real BitTorrent client to
crawl the tracker, but our own implementation of an opti-
mized lightweight BitTorrent client whose only one goal is
to retrieve a list of couples (IP,port). Therefore, we are able
to run several thousands of those clients at the same time
on a single machine. Second, all crawls to the tracker are
made using infohashes retrieved with the scrape-all requests,
which is much faster than working on .torrent files directly.
Indeed, to crawl the tracker we do not need any disk access
to read .torrent files and we do not need to compute the in-
fohash on each .torrent file. Finally, we create 100 processes
at the beginning of each crawl and then we give to each pro-
cess 10% of the infohashes to crawl. Therefore, we do not
have any process creation during a crawl.
During the first crawl of our measurement period, we
found 1,870,662 unique infohashes returned by the scrape-
all request. For all those infohashes, 675,161 corresponds to
effective torrents that are torrents with at least one seed and
one leecher. We were able to map 501,725 of the effective
torrents to .torrent files. For the 675,161 effective torrents,
the tracker announced 12,124,600 peers, and we retrieved the
couples (IP,port) for 11,263,752 (93%) of them. During the
last crawl of our measurement, we found 2,048,517 unique in-
fohashes, 715,063 effective torrents, and we were able to map
540,993 of those torrents to .torrent files. For the 715,063
effective torrents, the tracker announced 13,845,696 peers,
and we retrieved the couples (IP,port) for 12,894,258 (93%)
of them.
For all crawls, we retrieved 148 millions unique IP ad-
dresses spread among 21,257 ASes, representing 1.98 billions
of content downloads and 3.6 exabytes of data downloaded
by those peers. We identified 2,524,741 unique infohashes
among which 1,196,678 represent torrents with at least one
seed and one leecher.
3. PROFILING OF INITIAL SEEDS
In this section, we perform a detailed analysis of initial
seeds. We start by defining a methodology to identify initial
seeds of torrents and show that we can find the initial seeds
corresponding to the most active users. Then, we character-
ize the initial seeds in terms of type, volume, and number of
contents. Finally, we characterize the impact of initial seeds
on torrents performance.
In the following, we focus on the infrastructure used by
initial seeds that is best identified by IP addresses rather
than by the couple (IP,port). Indeed, the stability of the
port number varies greatly with BitTorrent clients. For in-
stance, the most popular BitTorrent clients can optionally
change the port number each time the client is restarted.
However, the IP address is not enough to identify uniquely
initial seeds. Indeed, several initial seeds can be behind the
same NAT or proxy leading to an erroneous identification of
a large initial seed, whereas it consists of several small initial
seeds. However, we show at the end of section 3.1 that using
IP addresses is reasonable in our context.
3.1 Identification of Initial Seeds
We start to introduce two methods, the active and passive
ones, to identify initial seeds. Then, we present three cate-
gories of users used to identify initial seeds with the passive
method. Finally, we discuss the two methods.
3.1.1 Two Methods to Identify Initial Seeds
Identifying initial seeds is complex. Indeed, most Bit-
Torrent clients implement intelligent initial seeding, usually
called super seeding, which makes initial seeds announce
themselves as leechers with no or few pieces. The rationale of
this strategy is to force leechers to download specific pieces
from the initial seed. Then the seed can monitor whether
the served pieces are indeed replicated among the leechers.
If this is not the case, the initial seed will stop sending pieces
to the leechers that do not contribute. Therefore, it is not
possible to identify initial seeds by joining a torrent as soon
as it appears and looking for the only one seed of the torrent.
In order to identify initial seeds, we developed two meth-
ods. We call the first method the active one. This method
identifies a peer as an initial seed when, joining a new tor-
rent, the crawler finds a single peer in the torrent. This
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Figure 1: Users classification according to initial
seeds strategy. all is the number of torrents inserted by
each user. top IP, resp. 2nd IP, is the IP address that we
find in the largest, resp. second largest, number of torrents
for a given user. cumul 4 shows the number of unique tor-
rents in which the 4 most active IP addresses are found for
each user.
peer can announce itself as a seed or a leecher, and we ver-
ified that, due to the super seeding mode, very few peers
announce themselves as a seed. As long as the peer is the
only one in the torrent, this method considers it as the ini-
tial seed. Indeed, as our crawler joins the torrent within the
first minute of its addition to The Pirate Bay Web site, it is
likely that this peer is the initial seed. Using this method,
we identified an initial seed for 21,544 torrents. However,
this method does not work when there are more than one
peer when the crawler joins a torrent.
We introduced a second method, called the passive one,
to identify initial seeds even for torrents joined too late for
the active method to be applicable. Then we use the active
method to validate the accuracy of the passive one, because
both methods identify initial seeds for torrents in a com-
pletely different way. The passive method groups torrents
according to the users that inserted them in The Pirate Bay
Web site. Then, for each user, we order the IP addresses col-
lected as described in section 2.2 according to the number of
torrents they appear in. The hypothesis we make, that we
validate in the following, is that, for each user, there is one
or a small community of initial seeds that seed all contents
for this user. By finding the IP addresses that appear the
most frequently per user, we are able to identify the initial
seeds for that user.
For the passive method, we only consider IP addresses
returned by the tracker during the first connection of the
crawler to the torrent. The rationale is that if an IP address
is not present during the first connection to the torrent, it
is unlikely it is an initial seed. The first IP address, that
we call top IP in the following, is the IP address that we
observe in the largest number of torrents inserted by a user.
The second IP address is the second most observed IP ad-
dress, etc. Using this methodology we identified three main
categories of users.
3.1.2 The Three Categories of Users
Fig. 1 shows the three categories of users identified with
the passive method. The first category of users is called
single user and is shown on the left plot. This category is
the one for which the top IP address for each user is present
Table 1: Validation of the passive method using the
active one. This table shows the success of the active and
passive methods to identify the same initial seeds for the
same torrents. Cat represents one of the three categories
of users. Active, resp. Passive, represents the number of
torrents for which the active, resp. passive, method has
identified an initial seed. The active method is independent
of the category, thus the same number for each category.
Active ∩ Passive is the number of torrents for which both
methods identified an initial seed. Success is the number
of such torrents for which both methods identified the same
initial seed.
Cat |Active| |Passive| |Active ∩ Passive| Success
single 21,544 9,125 5,796 100%
team 21,544 4,334 2,723 99.96%
community 21,544 1,849 724 100%
in more than 80% of its torrents. We only show the first
100 users ordered according to the number of torrents they
inserted, but we found 1,712 users in this category excluding
all users that inserted strictly fewer than two torrents. The
most striking result is that, except for the first user, the
second IP address to appear the most frequently is present
in just a few torrents for each user. Moreover, looking at
the mapping (top IP, user), we found that each user has a
different top IP address, which means that the presence of
a top IP address is not due to a peer that joined a large
number of torrents on The Pirate Bay Web site, but due
to a peer that is tightly linked to a user. We validate the
accuracy of the passive method for the single user category
using Table 1. Indeed, we see that when both the active and
passive methods find an initial seed for the same torrent, it
is always the same initial seed. In conclusion, for the single
user category, each user has a dedicated initial seed that we
identified.
The only one exception to the single user category is the
first user known as eztv. For this user, the first 10 IP ad-
dresses are present in more than 150 torrents each. In fact,
this user fosters peers that contribute faster than 10 Mbit/s
by giving them contents in preview keeping the torrents pri-
vate to them for a given period of time. Therefore, when a
torrent becomes public, there is already several fast peers,
always the same fast ones, in the torrent. For the eztv user,
we consider the top IP address as the initial seed. On the
contrary to the other users of the single user category, we
cannot be sure it is the initial seed, but it is anyway a peer
with a very important role for this user.
The second category of users is called team of users and
is shown in middle plot in Fig. 1. This category represents
the users with a small team of initial seeds. Indeed, for each
user, the number of unique torrents to which the 4 most
active IP addresses (cumul 4 curve) are connected to rep-
resents at least 80% of all torrents for this user. We only
show in Fig. 1 the first 100 users ordered according to the
number of torrents they inserted, but we identified 129 users
in this category, excluding all users that inserted fewer than
10 torrents. Those users are typical of Web sites maintain-
ing several types of torrents, one initial seed specialized per
type. Here we do not claim to find all initial seeds for this
category, but that the threshold of 4 IP addresses per user is
reasonable because it gives a very low number of false posi-
tive as shown in Table 1. Indeed, considering the four top IP
addresses in this category as initial seeds, we have a success
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Figure 2: Fraction torrents for which the initial seed
is identified by each method. On the x-axis, all is for
all torrents, a-b is for torrents between a and b peers 24
hours after the first connection of the crawler to the torrent,
and >1000 for torrents with more than 1,000 peers after 24
hours.
of 99.96% of initial seeds identified with the passive method
also identified with the active one for the same torrents. In
the following we consider the four first IP addresses for each
team of users to be initial seeds.
The last category of users is called community of users
and is shown in the right plot in Fig. 1. This category rep-
resents users with a large community of initial seeds. Indeed,
for each user, the number of unique torrents to which the 4
most active IP addresses (cumul 4 curve) are connected to
represents less than 80% of all torrents for this user. Those
users are typical of a large number of initial seeds federated
around a community of interest, usually a Web site allow-
ing its members to upload contents. We just represent in
Fig. 1 the first 100 users ordered according to the number
of torrents they inserted, but we identified 193 users for this
category, excluding all users that inserted fewer than 10 tor-
rents. In order to limit the number of false positive, we
decided to just consider the top IP address as the initial
seed per community of users. Indeed, we observe a 100%
success in Table 1.
3.1.3 Discussion of the Methods
Using the passive method, we have shown that for each
user some IP addresses appear frequently and that we can
consider the most frequent ones to be initial seeds. However,
this method can be misled by some peers connecting to all
torrents independently of the users who inserted them, those
users can be crawlers, highly active peers, etc. Fortunately,
such peers are rare and do not impact our results. Indeed,
only 77 initial seeds appear for more than one user, and only
8 for more than 3 users. Some initial seeds appear for a few
users because they usually participate in parallel to different
communities. As we will see in section 3.2, initial seeds are
specialized in one or a few types of contents. As the number
of suspicious initial seeds is very small, compared to the
2,206 initial seeds identified with the passive method, those
initial seeds will not impact our results.
We have seen in Table 1 that with the passive method we
can identify the initial seed for a large number of torrents
that we do not identify with the active one. Fig. 2 shows
the fraction of initial seeds identified and missed by each
method for different torrent sizes. The active method (ac-
tive) identifies the initial seed for 55% of all torrents, but
this fraction decreases with the torrent size, down to 16%
for torrent with more than 1,000 peers. The percentage of
torrents detected with the passive method in Fig. 2 excludes
all torrents already identified with the active one. We see
that the passive method (single, team, community) discov-
ers the initial seed for around 15% of all torrents, but the
detection ratio improves with the torrent size. In partic-
ular, for torrents with more then 1,000 peers, the passive
method detects initial seeds for 30% of the torrents, better
than the active one that detects initial seeds for 17% of the
torrents. On all torrents, the combination of the active and
passive methods succeed to detect the initial seed for 70% of
all torrents and 47% of large torrents with more than 1,000
peers.
We now focus on which torrents are missed by the passive
method. We see in Fig. 2 that there are 13% of torrents
that are not associated to any user (no user). Thus the pas-
sive method does not work for such torrents. There are 7%
of torrents that are missed because they are excluded (excl)
from the classification in the category single user (users that
inserted fewer than 2 torrents), and the categories team and
community of users (users that inserted fewer than 10 tor-
rents). Finally, the number of torrents in each category, but
for which the passive method identified the initial seed is
negligible for the categories single user (!single) and team of
users (!team), but important for the category community of
users (!community), up to 20% for large torrents. In fact,
our methodology is conservative for the category community
of users as we just consider the top IP address as an initial
seed. As our goal is not to identify all initial seeds, but a
significant fraction of them well spread over all torrent sizes
and all users, we did not try to improve further the method-
ology for the category community of users. This is an area
of improvement for future work.
The correlation we observe in Table 1 is not trivial as
the active and passive methods detect seeds in a very dif-
ferent way. In particular, the passive method significantly
improves the number of torrents for which an initial seed is
identified. However, the passive method detects less than
5% of initial seeds in addition to the active method. Indeed,
with the active method we identified 9,184 different initial
seeds, and 2,206 with the passive one among which 432 only
(less than 5%) were new initial seeds not yet identified with
the active method. The reason is that large torrents, the
most challenging for the active method, are usually seeded
by highly active initial seeds. As those seeds appear in small
and large torrents, the active method can identify those ini-
tial seeds for at least a few small torrents.
An important limitation of our methodology is that we
use IP addresses as identifiers for initial seeds. Indeed, it is
possible to aggregate several initial seeds behind the same
NAT or proxy and incorrectly identify those seeds as a single
one with the IP address of the NAT or proxy. However, we
have several evidences that this is not the case. First, initial
seeds do not overlap on different users. With initial seeds
behind a NAT or proxy we would have expected to see initial
seeds for different users behind the same IP address, which
is not the case. Second, we will see in section 3.2 that part of
the most active initial seeds are on European hosting centers.
In that case, all IP addresses are static and public. Finally,
for all initial seeds we have checked the BitTorrent client
version with time. We found that for each initial seed, the
client ID remains the same for all torrents of this seed, or
Figure 3: Tags cloud of torrents seeded by initial
seeds during the 48 days of crawl. We extract the two
most significant keywords from the torrent names and vary
their police size to reflect the number of torrents whose name
matches those keywords, the largest the keywords, the more
frequent those keywords appear in name of torrents.
that the client is updated at one point in time. If the NAT
or proxy had impacted our results, we would have observed
much more variability in BitTorrent client IDs and we would
have observed a much larger number of initial seeds serving
different users.
In conclusion, we have developed a methodology to iden-
tify a large fraction of initial seeds. Indeed, we have iden-
tified the initial seed for 70% of all torrents inserted during
our 48 days crawl. A striking outcome of the passive method
is that we can identify the initial seed or a small community
of initial seeds for a large number of active users. In the fol-
lowing we consider as initial seeds all seeds discovered using
the active and passive methods.
3.2 Characterization of Initial Seeds
In this section, we focus on the type of contents served by
initial seeds, on the localization of those initial seeds, and
on their overall impact in terms of seeded contents.
Fig. 3 shows a tags cloud1 of significant keywords in tor-
rent names for all torrents seeded by the initial seeds. Here
we see that the name of most of the contents inserted by
initial seeds contains keywords referring to copyrighted ma-
terial. However, as we do not analyze the content inserted
by initial seeds, we just check that each piece is valid us-
ing SHA-1 fingerprint contained in .torrent files, we cannot
conclude on the amount of contents with a copyright. It
is anyway interesting to see that the contents inserted by
initial seeds closely follow events. Indeed, two weeks before
we started our crawl Michael Jackson died, and one week
after starting our crawl the latest Harry Potter movie was
released.
We surprisingly observe in Fig. 4 that a small number
of initial seeds, compared to the 9M unique IP addresses
1All tags cloud in this paper were generated using
http://www.wordle.net with the Creative Commons Attri-
bution 3.0 license.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of torrents
seeded by each initial seed. The top plot shows the num-
ber of contents per initial seed and the bottom plot shows
the cumulative distribution of torrents.
Table 2: Rank, number of contents, volume of con-
tents (GB), country code, and AS name for the top
20 initial seeds.
Rank # contents Volume CC AS name
1 313 136 NZ Vodafone
2 304 79 FR OVH
3 266 152 DE Keyweb
4 246 34 FR OVH
5 219 186 FR OVH
6 212 247 DE Keyweb
7 201 535 FR OVH
8 181 73 US HV
9 181 17 CA Wightman
10 180 7 SK Energotel
11 172 161 FR OVH
12 167 23 RU Corgina
13 145 197 DE Keyweb
14 140 11 FR OVH
15 138 109 US Aaron
16 132 12 US Charter
17 117 119 FR OVH
18 116 109 FR OVH
19 114 79 NL Telfort
20 107 225 RU Matrix
we have seen during our crawl, seed most of the torrents.
Indeed, we observe in Fig. 4, top plot, that the most active
initial seeds are seeds for a large number of torrents during
the 48 days of our crawl. Moreover, according to Fig. 4,
bottom plot, those most active initial seeds are initial seeds
for a large fraction of the torrents seeded; the top 100 initial
seeds represent 30% of all the torrents seeded, and the top
1,000 initial seeds represent 60% of all the torrents seeded.
Focusing on the top 20 initial seeds in Table 2, we ob-
serve that half of those initial seeds are located in France
and Germany. In fact, OVH that is located in France and
Keyweb that is located in Germany are very large host-
ing centers offering, for a cheap price, high profile servers
with a high speed, typically 100Mbit/s, network connectiv-
ity. Those servers are used to run what is called a seedbox
that is a dedicated server specialized in file sharing. Those
seedboxes come with a dedicated support, installed BitTor-
rent clients, and can be remotely administered using, for
instance, a Web interface like the one offered by Torrent-
Flux [3]. Therefore, those seedboxes attract initial seeds
that require a high speed network connectivity.
However, concluding that the human beings behind those
initial seeds live in the countries of the hosting centers would
be a mistake. Indeed, those servers are rented by people
abroad from those countries. For the 1,515 torrents seeded
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Figure 5: Repartition in types of torrents seeded by
the top 20 initial seeds. all represents the repartition for
all initial seeds found in the crawl.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the number of torrents
seeded per AS. The top plot shows the number of contents
per AS and the bottom plot shows the cumulative distribu-
tion.
by the initial seeds in OVH among the top 20 initial seeds,
we parsed the content names to find some specific strings, all
matches are case insensitive. We found 552 times the word
spanish, and after a manual inspection found that it always
refers to a content translated in Spanish, or to a content with
Spanish subtitles. Looking for the string fr, which is typical
for contents in French, and ge or de, for contents in Ger-
man, we only found after manual inspection 13 contents in
French (all related to learning material for children), and 5
in German. Concerning Keyweb, for the 623 torrents seeded
by initial seeds in Keyweb among the top 20, we found 228
content names matching the string spanish and confirmed
that all those names refer to contents in Spanish. However,
we did not find, after manual inspection, any content match-
ing the strings fr, ge, or de referring to contents in French
or German.
Looking at the repartition per content type of contents
seeded by the first 20 initial seeds in Fig. 5, we observe that
those seeds are highly specialized in one or two types of
contents. This specialization in types of contents explains
why we do not observe any correlation in Table 2 between
the number of contents and the volume of contents. Indeed,
some types of contents, like app or audio, are much smaller
than other types, like video.
We now focus on the distribution of the initial seeds per
Table 3: Rank, number of contents, volume of con-
tents (GB), country code, and AS name for the top
20 ASes.
Rank # contents Volume CC AS name
1 2,791 2,984 FR OVH
2 1,084 1,343 EU Telenor
3 707 756 DE Keyweb
4 503 403 US AT&T
5 516 385 US Verizon
6 480 811 NL Zigoo
7 422 317 US Charter
8 400 393 EU Telia
9 388 373 AT UPC
10 359 316 EU NTL
11 358 380 NL Telfort
12 354 161 US High Velocity
13 342 300 GB BE
14 323 197 GB iNet
15 316 136 NZ Vodafone
16 298 221 IT Telecom Italia
17 284 44 AU MPX
18 264 230 SE ComHem
19 250 118 US Qwest
20 232 130 ES Telefonica
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Figure 7: Repartition in types of torrents seeded by
the top 20 ASes. all represents the repartition for all
ASes found in the crawl.
AS. We observe in Fig. 6 that the top AS represents 10%
of all the contents seeded during our crawl, and the top 10
ASes represent 30% of all the contents seeded.
Indeed, we see in Table 3 that OVH is, by far, the most
popular AS for initial seeds. Among the other top 20 ASes
there is only one other hosting center, Keyweb, that is
ranked third. The other ASes are classical Internet (ADSL,
or optical) providers. Therefore, top ranked initial seeds can
be hosted using a broadband home connection, even if the
dedicated solution offered by hosting centers attracts a large
fraction of highly active initial seeds.
Unlike for initial seeds, Fig. 7 shows that all types of con-
tents are seeded from most of the ASes. Therefore, there is
no correlation between the type of content seeded and the
AS of the initial seed. This is due to the large number of ini-
tial seeds per AS. The main exception is Vodafone (ranked
15) for which most of the content (313 over 316) are seeded
by a single initial seed that we identified as an initial seed
of the user eztv that is specialized in TV show contents.
In conclusion, we have seen that whereas contents are
downloaded by millions of peers, most contents are seeded
by a small community of highly active initial seeds. How-
ever, deriving the country of the human being operating an
initial seed based on the IP address of this initial seed would
be misleading. Therefore, carefully building maps of BitTor-
rent usage has to be done. We provided here new results and
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Figure 8: Availability (top) and upload speed (bot-
tom) of initial seeds. all and top20 represent the avail-
ability of for all initial seeds and of the top 20 initial seeds
for each torrent they seed. always available is for all initial
seeds that are always available.
a new methodology in that direction.
3.3 Performance Issues with Initial Seeds
In this section, we exhibit a fundamental issue for initial
seeds in the way torrents are queued in BitTorrent clients,
then we explore the impact of initial seeds upload speed on
torrents performance.
In the following, we only consider the initial seeds dis-
covered with the active method. The reason is that finding
the initial seed with the active method guarantees that the
crawler joined the torrent when it was created. Therefore,
all performance measures can be conducted during the entire
period of initial seeding, i.e., up to the moment the initial
seed has uploaded an entire copy of the content.
For a given torrent, let T be a period of time ranging
from the time the crawler joined this torrent to the time the
initial seed of the torrent has uploaded a full copy of the
content. A new piece is a piece that was never observed by
the crawler in its neighborhood, except on the initial seed.
As the initial seed is the only one to have new pieces, when
the crawler receives at least one new piece or one HAVE
message for a new piece during a 10 minutes period, we say
that the initial seed has been active during this period. By
definition, the presence of the initial seed during a period T
is the sum of the duration of all 10 minutes periods included
in T during which the initial seed has been active. We have
also tested with periods of 20 and 30 minutes without any
significant differences. The availability of an initial seed for
each torrent is its time of presence divided by T .
To monitor the upload speed of an initial seed, we count
the number of unique HAVE messages for new pieces re-
ceived during the period T , multiply it by the size of a piece,
and divide it by T . Therefore, we compute the average up-
load speed of initial seeds during a period T .
To monitor the download speed of a neighbor, we count
the number of HAVE messages it sent to the crawler up to
the moment the initial seed has uploaded a full copy of the
content or to the moment the neighbor has left the peer set
of the crawler. The calculation is similar as for the upload
speed of the initial seed.
3.3.1 Queuing Issues of Initial Seeds
Surprisingly, we see in Fig. 8 top plot, that only 30% of the
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Figure 9: Availability, upload speed, and seeding
time for two initial seeds running µTorrent. The two
initial seeds are seed 14 and 18 as shown in Table 2, both
are hosted by OVH.
initial seeds are always connected to the torrent they seed
(all curve) from the instant the crawler joined the torrent
up to the instant the initial seed has uploaded a full copy
of the content. We also see that during the period of time
required to upload a content, 50% of the initial seeds were
disconnected from the torrent 20% of the time. Moreover,
we see that the availability of the top 20 initial seeds (top20
curve) is not dramatically better, whereas we expected to
observe highly available initial seeds. To compute the avail-
ability, we have also tested periods of 20 and 30 minutes,
instead of 10 minutes, without any significant difference.
We observe that the average upload speed on all initial
seeds, all in Fig. 8 bottom plot, is highly variable depend-
ing on the torrents, 35% of the torrents are uploaded at
less than 10 kByte/s by the initial seed, and 15% of the
torrents uploaded at more than 100 kByte/s. We observed
that the average upload speed for the top 20 initial seeds
(top20 curve) and the seeds always available (always avail-
able curve) is very similar, but the average upload speed is
not as high as we expected. Indeed, we see for the top 20 ini-
tial seeds that 65% of the torrents are uploaded at less than
100 kByte/s, whereas half of them are hosted by dedicated
hosting centers with high speed network connectivity.
In order to understand the large difference we observe be-
tween the actual availability and upload speed per torrent,
and what we expected, we focus on the top 20 initial seeds.
Fig. 9 shows the availability, upload speed, and seeding time
of two initial seeds hosted by OVH. As those seeds are hosted
in the same location, we expected to observe a similar per-
formance, which is not the case. Indeed, we observe that
seed 18 is typical of a high performing initial seed. It has
a high availability, always available for 77% of the torrents,
and offer an excellent average upload speed, larger than 100
kByte/s for all torrents and larger than 1,000 kByte/s for
10% of the torrents. However, seed 14 is performing poorly.
It is always available for less than 10% of its torrents, and
the average upload speed is lower than 10 kByte/s for 55%
of the torrents.
The reason of this behavior is explained by the seeding
time of those initial seeds and reveals a fundamental is-
sue with the queuing algorithm used in BitTorrent clients.
Fig. 9, right plot, shows the seeding time for both initial
seeds. We define the seeding time of a torrent as the period
of time starting from the first time we saw the initial seed
to the last time the initial seed was in that torrent2. We
observe that seed 18, the one performing best, seeds torrent
just a few hours and at most 4 days in the worst case. In
the contrary, seed 14 seeds 28% of its torrents more than 5
days, up to 23 days.
In order to understand the impact of the seeding time
on availability and upload speed, we need to introduce the
concept of queuing used by BitTorrent clients. The two most
popular BitTorrent clients, µTorrent and Vuze [11], use a
similar notion of queuing, but here we focus on µTorrent.
Although it is possible to add to a BitTorrent client a large
number of .torrent files, the client will only connect to a few
torrents that we call the active torrents. The rationale is
to guarantee a good upload speed per torrent. Therefore,
the number of active torrents in parallel is a function of the
client upload capacity. With µTorrent, an upload speed of 1
Mbit/s corresponds to 6 active torrents, and 10 Mbit/s to 15.
Which torrent will be active is determined by the queuing
algorithm of the client. This algorithm is a collection of
many heuristics. In particular, a newly started torrent will
have the highest priority for 60 minutes, and a torrent with
no seed will have a high priority in the queue. If the first
copy of the content takes more than 60 minutes to complete,
which is likely, and that the µTorrent client has many other
unpopular torrents with no seed in the queue, then it is
possible that the newly added torrent will be stopped and
that an unpopular torrent will become active instead. In
fact, as there is no notion of initial seeds in µTorrent, there
is no way for the client to discover that the content has not
yet been uploaded at least once. This pathological behavior
is likely to appear with initial seeds with several unpopular
contents queued.
Whereas the initial seed 18 leaves fast the torrents it seeds,
thus a small number of torrents queued in the BitTorrent
client, the initial seed 14 stays in the torrents it seeds for
a long time, thus a large list of torrents queued. As a con-
sequence, torrents for initial seed 14 are likely to become
inactive, due to the queuing heuristics we described, before
a first copy of the content is uploaded. This period of in-
activity will have a dramatic impact on the availability and
average upload speed of the initial seeds for those torrents.
Our conclusion is confirmed on all torrents seeded by the
top 20 initial seeds in Fig. 10. Indeed, we observe that the
torrent with the highest average upload speed are torrents
always available (top plot) and torrents with a small seeding
time (bottom plot).
In summary, whereas the queuing heuristics in BitTorrent
clients seeks to maximize the upload utilization of a peer, it
does not appear to be adapted to the case of initial seeds.
Indeed, for initial seeds, it is fundamental to upload a full
copy of a content as soon as possible even if it is at the
expense of a lower overall utilization of the upload capacity
on the client.
One way to solve this issue would be to create an initial
seed property per torrent. Then the BitTorrent client should
give the highest priority to torrents for which it is the ini-
tial seed when one copy of the content has not been fully
uploaded. It is beyond the scope of this study to perform
a detailed analysis of the queuing algorithms used in Bit-
2This information is not obtained by the initial seeds crawl
that just collects information for the first 24 hours of the
torrent’s life, but by the large-scale crawl that we describe
in section 2.3 restricted to the same 48 days as the initial
seeds crawl.
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Figure 10: Correlation Availability, upload speed,
and seeding time for all torrents seeded by the top
20 initial seeds. Each dot represent the correlation of a
single torrent seeded by one of the top 20 initial seeds.
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Figure 11: Impact of initial seeds upload speed on
torrent performance with torrent size. The lines rep-
resent the correlation between the initial seeds’ upload speed
and average peers’ download speed for torrents with 1− 10
peers (torrent size 1), 11 − 100 peers (torrent size 2), and
more than 100 peers (torrent size 3). The error bars repre-
sent the 30th and 80th percentiles computed on all peers.
Torrent clients, but it is undoubtedly an interesting area of
future investigation. In particular, there is a significant area
of improvement for initial seeds queuing strategy.
3.3.2 Impact of the Upload Speed of Initial Seeds on
Torrents Performance
In this section, we only consider initial seeds that are
always available. Interestingly, the upload speed of initial
seeds is correlated to torrents performance independently of
the torrent size. Indeed, we see in Fig. 11 that the larger
the upload speed of the initial seeds, the larger the aver-
age download speed on peers. We also observe that the gap
between the 30th and the 80th percentiles increases. This
is due to the heterogeneity of the download speed of peers.
Some peers have low download speed, therefore, increasing
the insertion of new pieces in the torrent will not bring much
benefits. However, other peers are very fast and they will
benefit from an larger upload of the initial seed.
This is confirmed by Fig. 12. We see that the fast peers
benefit more from a high upload speed of the initial seed
than slow ones.
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Figure 12: Impact of initial seeds upload speed on
peers download speed. We give the peers download speed
statistics for all torrent sizes. The lines represent the cor-
relation between the initial seeds’ upload speed and a given
percentile of peers’ download speed.
In conclusion, we have shown that on 24,544 torrent in-
serted during a 48 days period, the upload speed of the initial
seeds is critical to the download speed of peers. Whereas it
is known that the upload speed of initial seeds is important
for the performance of torrents [6] and that models [10] pre-
dict that the torrent size does not significantly affect the
peers download completion time, it is fundamental to vali-
date that on a large number of real torrents and with real
peers those findings are true.
4. PROFILING OF HIGHLY ACTIVE
PEERS
In this section, we focus on the characterization of highly
active peers, i.e., peers that are seen in the largest number
of torrents. However, this characterization is challenging
because of the huge size of the trace generated by the crawler
described in section 2.3. In particular, we found 148M IP
addresses and more than 510M couples (IP,port) collected
on a period of 103 days.
Ordering the IP addresses according to the total number
of unique torrents in which we see them on the 103 days
of the large-scale crawl, we observe a power law relation.
In particular, the top 10,000 IP addresses that we observed
in the largest number of torrents were present in at least
1,636 torrents each during the 103 days, the top 100,000 IP
addresses were present in at least 309 torrents. In the re-
maining part of this section, we specifically focus on the top
10,000 IP addresses, as we want to understand the behavior
of highly active peers. Therefore, those top 10,000 IP ad-
dresses are the ones that are seen in the largest number of
torrents on the 103 days period.
However, characterizing highly active peers with a large-
scale continuous crawl is challenging. Indeed, it is hard to
identify a peer using its IP address or the couple (IP,port),
because the meaning of this information is different depend-
ing on the way the peer connects to torrents. A peer can
connect through a NAT operated by its ISP due to scarcity
of IP addresses allocated to its ISP. It may want to hide
its identity from anti-piracy groups using HTTP or SOCKS
proxies, using paid-for BitTorrent proxies like iPREDator
operated by The Pirate Bay that are usually SOCKS prox-
ies offering a VPN service, or using anonymous networks
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Figure 13: Correlation of the number of ports per
IP address and of the number of torrents for the top
10, 000 IP addresses. Each dot represents an IP address.
The solid line is the average number of torrents on the 148M
IP addresses computed per interval of 2, 000 ports.
like Tor [2]. In all those cases, a large number of peers can
be seen using the same IP address. Furthermore, the couple
(IP,port) cannot be used to uniquely identify a peer, as there
is no guarantee that a port or IP associated to a peer will
remain the same over time. Therefore, in many cases, just
using the IP address or the couple (IP,port) can erroneously
make a peer be identified as a highly active peer. We focus
on those false positives in the following. On the contrary, a
highly active peer using a dynamic IP address can be iden-
tified as a regular peer. We do not consider this case of false
negatives in the following, as we believe that false positives
are more frequent than false negatives. However, this is a
possible area of improvement in the future.
We confirm this complexity in Fig. 13 where we can see
that neither an IP address nor the couple (IP,port) can be
used to uniquely identify a peer in all cases. Indeed, we see
in Fig. 13 that for most of the IP addresses the number of
torrents increases linearly with the number of ports. More-
over, the slope of this increase corresponds to the slope of
the average number of torrents per IP over all 148M IP ad-
dresses (solid line). Each new port corresponds to between
2 and 3 additional contents per IP address. Therefore, it is
likely that those IP addresses correspond to NATs with a
large number of users behind them. There are also many IP
addresses for which the number of torrents is much larger.
Thus those IP addresses do not correspond to the typical
behavior of a NAT.
In order to understand what are the IP addresses that
significantly differ from NATs, we identify 6 categories of
highly active peers. The two first categories are HTTP and
SOCKS public proxies for which we retrieved from the sites
hidemyass.com and proxy.org a list of IP addresses. We
found in those lists 81 HTTP proxies and 62 SOCKS proxies
within the top 10,000 IP addresses.
The third category is composed of Tor nodes for which
we performed a reverse DNS lookup for the top 10,000 IP
addresses and extracted all names containing the tor key-
word and manually filtered the results to make sure they
are indeed Tor nodes. We also retrieved a list of nodes on
the Web site proxy.org. We found a total of 174 Tor nodes
within the top 10,000 IP addresses.
The fourth category is composed of monitors. A monitor
corresponds to a peer that spies a huge number of torrents
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Figure 14: Correlation of the number of ports per
IP address and of the number of torrents among the
top 10, 000 IP addresses for six categories of highly
active peers. Each dot represents an IP address. The
solid line is the average number of torrents on the 148M IP
addresses computed per interval of 2, 000 ports.
without downloading anything. We identified two ASes, cor-
responding to hosting centers located in the USA and in
UK, containing a large number of IP addresses within the
top 10,000 with the same behavior. Indeed, we were never
able to download any piece from those IP addresses, and all
those IP addresses always use a single port in the 103 days.
Therefore, those IP addresses do not look like regular peers,
but like a permanent infrastructure. We found 1052 such IP
addresses within only two ASes.
The fifth category is composed of paid-for BitTorrent
proxies that we call VPN in the following to make a clear dis-
tinction with the generic purpose HTTP and SOCKS prox-
ies. To find VPNs, we performed a reverse DNS lookup
for the top 10,000 IP addresses and extracted all names
containing the itshidden, cyberghostvpn, peer2me, ipredate,
mullvad, and perfect-privacy keywords and manually filtered
the results to make sure they are indeed the corresponding
VPNs. Those keywords correspond to well know paid-for
VPN services. We found 30 VPNs within the top 10,000 IP
addresses.
The last category is composed of heavy peers that cor-
responds to IP addresses that used fewer than 10 different
ports during the 103 days of the trace, and from which the
crawler downloaded pieces. Therefore, those highly active
peers cannot be a large NAT due to the small number of
ports, or a monitor as data is downloaded from them. They
correspond to real peers that we saw in a large number of
torrents. We found 77 such heavy peers.
We do not claim that we have found all peers in each cate-
gory. Instead, we have identified a few peers in each category
within the top 10,000 peers that we use to characterize the
behavior of the highly active peers.
We see in Fig. 14 that for HTTP and SOCKS proxies the
number of torrents per IP address is much larger than for
NATed IP addresses (solid line). Considering the huge num-
ber of torrents in which we see those IP addresses, compared
to the case of heavy peers, it is likely that the proxies are
used by anti-piracy groups. Indeed, we see in Fig. 15 that the
crawler suddenly stops discovering new IP addresses for the
monitors category after day 50. In fact, by that date, The
Pirate Bay tracker changed its blacklisting strategy to reject
IP addresses that are present in a large number of torrents
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Figure 15: Benefit of the continuous crawl compared
to a single snapshot to identify highly active peers
of 6 categories. For each snapshot we compute the top
10, 000 IP addresses that we observed in the largest number
of torrents. The dashed line represents the number of IP
addresses of a given category discovered in the top 10, 000
IP addresses of each snapshot that are also among the top
10, 000 IP addresses that downloaded the largest number
of torrents on all snapshots. The solid line represents the
cumulative number of those discovered IP addresses.
with a much lower threshold (which was not an issue for our
crawler as we unsubscribe regularly from the tracker, see sec-
tion 2.3). The result is that monitors that we identified were
unable to continue to spy torrents using this strategy. How-
ever, we observe at day 80 that the number of HTTP and
SOCKS proxies suddenly increased, probably corresponding
to anti-piracy groups migrating their monitoring infrastruc-
ture from dedicated hosting centers to proxies. Considering,
the coordination we observe in Fig. 15 in the increase of the
HTTP and SOCKS proxies, it is likely that those proxies
were used in a coordinated effort.
The correlation for monitors and heavy users in Fig. 14
does not show any striking result, therefore we do not dis-
cuss it further. However, we observe in Fig. 14 that for
Tor nodes and VPNs the number of torrents per IP address
is close to the NATed IP addresses (solid line). For large
number of ports, Tor nodes deviate from the standard be-
havior of NATed IP addresses. In fact, we found that just a
few IP addresses are responsible of this deviation, all other
Tor nodes following the trend of the solid line. We guess
that those few IP addresses responsible for the deviation
are also used to spy torrents. Indeed, it is unlikely that a
highly active peer will use Tor nodes due to their poor per-
formance. Indeed, using the initial seeds crawl we performed
measures of download speed of peers for 3,191,145 different
peers. Those measures are performed by counting HAVE
messages received by the crawler. We see in Fig. 16 that
the performance of Tor nodes is really poor. However, the
performance of the heavy peers is better, but still lower than
the average. In fact, we see that the fastest heavy peers are
very fast and that some peers are very slow. This behavior is
typical of the queuing issues discussed in section 3.3.1 when
there are a lot of torrents queued in a BitTorrent client.
But, this issue is not as critical as it is for initial seeds, be-
cause even if the performance per torrent is poor, the overall
performance of the BitTorrent client might be good. Also,
we observe that the performance is the best for VPNs. In
fact, that means that peers using VPNs are usually very
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Figure 16: Performance of peers. all is for the 3M of
peers for which we performed a download measure.
fast peers, and that VPNs do not dramatically decrease the
performance of those peers.
Finally, we see in Fig. 15 that the information obtained
with a continuous crawl is much larger that with a single
snapshot of the peers. Indeed, for instance, whereas we take
12 snapshots per day (one every two hours), we need more
than 20 days of continuous crawl to discover 60% of the
heavy peers. The sawtooth behavior is due to the diurnal
pattern, and the lack of sawtooth behavior is due to some
snapshots that we failed to capture after a crash of the ma-
chine performing our crawls.
In summary, we identified 6 different categories of highly
active peers using our large-scale continuous crawl. In par-
ticular, we have been able to identify anti-piracy groups
spying torrents, and we even identified a change in their
monitoring infrastructure, which make us confident that our
crawl covers most of the highly active peers. We confirmed
the belief that Tor is inefficient for BitTorrent distribution
and found that VPN solutions are usually used by well-
provisioned peers. Last, we have shown that capturing a
single snapshot, while much easier, will bring significantly
less information than a continuous crawl.
5. RELATED WORK
Our work differs from the related work in scale, time span,
and focus. As for the scale, Siganos et al. crawled the top
600 torrents from The Pirate Bay [9] Web site during 45
days collecting 37M IP addresses. They do not give the
number of simultaneously observed IP addresses, but using
a small number of parallel torrents prevents from identifying
top initial seeds and highly active peers. Choffnes et al. [4]
monitored 3,029 simultaneous peers on average, and Piatek
et al. partially crawled 55,523 torrents [7]. It is unclear how
many simultaneous peers Piatek and al. have monitored as
they reported being detected and blocked when being too
aggressive [8]. Dan et al., who reported to have crawled
2.4M torrents with 37M peers, used a different terminology
for crawling [5]. Indeed, they performed scrape requests to
tracker, which only gives the number of peers per torrent,
but not the IP addresses of those peers. The data they
collected is much easier to get and completely different in
the focus. Zhang et al. [11] collected .torrent files for 4.6M
torrents during a nine month period. However, they only
present a single crawl of trackers, using an infrastructure of
35 machines, that consists in 5M IP addresses collected on
a 12 hours period.
None of those studies addresses the identification of initial
seeds and highly active peers, nor they present the traces to
perform such a work.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, using two crawls of BitTorrent, we perform
the first in-depth analysis of initial seeds and highly active
peers. We show that it is possible to identify the IP address
of initial seeds and to map those seeds to users that inserted
torrents in torrent indexing sites for 70% of the torrents.
We show that the initial seeds form a small community and
that some of the most active initial seeds use hosting centers,
which make the identification of the location of the human
being running those initial seeds complex. Finally, we show
that there is a fundamental issue in the way torrents are
queued in BitTorrent clients for initial seeds.
We also show that highly active peers represent several
very different categories of peers including monitors, NATs,
VPNs, proxies, and heavy peers. Using the large-scale con-
tinuous crawl we were able to track anti-piracy groups, to
confirm that Tor is inefficient for BitTorrent distribution
and that VPN solutions like iPREDator are used by well-
provisioned peers.
We have shown that it is possible to continuously monitor
a significant fraction of all torrents of the Internet from a
single machine. This undoubtedly raises many concerns on
the privacy of users running BitTorrent. However, fixing this
privacy issue is not trivial as it partly comes from the very
open design of the trackers. Exploring how to improve the
privacy of users running BitTorrent is an interesting area for
future work.
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